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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies on World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement suggest 
different aspects as to how developing countries tend to fail in executing their bargaining 
power in dispute settlement. One aspect that has yet to be analyzed is developing country 
bargaining power with respect to likelihood of settlement in such international disputes. A 
further analysis on the topic sheds light on another dimension on how international dispute 
mechanisms do not necessarily bring forth “right” over “might”. 
 This thesis focuses on International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), a platform on which developing countries face foreign investors, and highlights how 
the established mechanisms of dispute resolution cannot protect the bargaining power of 
developing countries due to their dependence on further foreign direct investment (FDI). This 
study adds another dimension through which one can observe the relative weak stance 
developing nations have when it comes to international disputes. 
 A simple formal model emphasizes the role of reputation as a factor in determining the 
bargaining power a country has with respect to an investment dispute case. The indications of 
the model are tested by running a logit model on the outcomes of these dispute cases. 
Findings suggest potential loss of reputation increases the likelihood of observing a settlement 
as the bargaining power of the developing country decreases. Additional factors that affect the 
bargaining power are the country’s income level, level of available FDI in the world and the 
extent to which the state faces external turmoil. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Dünya Ticaret Örgütü dava çözümlerini inceleyen şimdiye kadar yapılmış 
araştırmalar, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin dava çözümlerinde pazarlık güçlerini hangi açılardan 
koruyamadıklarını göstermektedir. Henüz araştırılmamış bir nokta gelişmekte olan ülkelerin 
pazarlık güçlerinin, davalardaki uzlaşma olasılığı ile olan ilişkisidir. Bu konu üzerinde 
yapılacak bir analiz, uluslararası çözüm mekanizmalarının nasıl “doğru”nun değil, “gücün” 
geçerliliğini yaşattığını bize yeni bir açıdan gösterecektir. 
 Bu tez gelişmekte olan ülkelerin yabancı yatırımcılarla karşı karşıya geldiği ICSID 
platform üzerinde yoğunlaşıp, varolan çözüm mekanizmalarının, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin 
pazarlık güçlerini, ülkelerin doğrudan yabancı yatırım bağlılığından dolayı, nasıl 
koruyamadığını göstermektedir. Bu araştırma gelişmekte olan ülkelerin uluslararası 
davalardaki nispeten daha zayıf duruşlarının bir başka açıdan ortaya çıkarmaktadır. 
 Basit bir oyun kuramı modeli itibar faktörünün, yatırım davalarındaki pazarlık gücünü 
belirlemedeki önemini ortaya koymaktadır. Modelin endikasyonları logit modeli ile uluslarası 
davalara bakılarak test edilmiştir. Sonuçlar potansiyel itibar kayıplarının, davalarda 
uzlaşmaya varılması olasılığını arttırdığını göstermektedir. Pazarlık gücünü ve uzlaşma 
ihtimalini etkileyen diğer faktörler, ülke gelirleri, dünyadaki mevcut doğrudan yatırım miktarı 
ve ülkelerin ne derece dış politikalarında sorun yaşadıkları olmuştur. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The political power of developing nations, when it comes to bargaining in the 
context of international disputes, has been a topic of interest, especially with respect to 
WTO dispute settlement. Whether or not economic power translates into political 
power, and under what circumstances are important aspects of international political 
economy. This study aims to pinpoint yet another dimension as to how and when 
developing countries fail to realize their political power, due to restrictions on economic 
status. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important for 
developing host countries. The increase in its volume and scope has led to proliferation 
of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) across nations that act as mutual agreements on 
terms with respect to investments made across borders. One of the crucial goals of these 
agreements is to provide protection to foreign investors. The recent trend in offering 
such protection has been the inclusion of specific clauses that designate International 
Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as the primary legal arbitration 
platform. A massive increase in the number of disputes brought to ICSID in the past 
decade, along with its relative transparency with respect to dispute content, compared to 
other forms of arbitration, have led to another function the Centre came to provide; 
signaling international investment community the type of behavior a host government 
has conducted with respect to its treatment of foreign investors. The majority of 
disputes brought to ICSID are cases opened by investors due to alleged poor behavior of 
host governments. The negative effect of, signals of poor behavior, on the future levels 
of FDI have been studied by Allee and Peinhardt (2011). This study focuses on the 
effects of such signals as they are translated into loss of reputation that in turn, affect 
the bargaining power of host governments. 
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The central claim of this study is that the reputation costs incurred from previous 
involvement with ICSID arbitration will increase the likelihood of settlement in cases 
the host government will face in the future periods. Previous signals of poor behavior 
will weaken the bargaining power the host government has over the current dispute. 
This is due to the fact that already having a less than desirable reputation will create an 
incentive for the host government to settle the dispute as quickly as possible. Previous 
literature does not offer much on the reputation generating effect of international 
dispute arbitration. This is due to several reasons. First, even though it was formed in 
1966, ICSID has emerged as the main platform of investment dispute resolution only 
recently in the past decade. Second, mechanisms of international arbitration, and 
various international institutions that were commonly used before ICSID, such as 
International Court of Arbitration or International Chamber of Commerce were not 
transparent with respect to their proceedings and thus, not enough information was 
available (Mattli, 2001). Third, domestic courts were the initial platform for disputes 
concerning a foreign investor and a host state, as the investments were considered to 
made under the laws and regulation of the host country. Only when host states started to 
face international agreements, upheld in international organizations like ICSID more 
frequently that, behavior and consequently reputation, started to become public 
knowledge across international investment community. Therefore, this study fills an 
important gap in the literature, with its focus on the effect of this emerging dispute 
resolution mechanism on host state behavior. A formal model is presented to 
conceptualize the effect of reputation on host government behavior. In contrast to their 
opposing parties, the foreign investor corporations, for host governments being involved 
in a dispute not only implies legal monetary costs, but also implies additional reputation 
costs. This additional burden decreases the amount they are willing to settle for, 
increasing the likelihood of outcome for cases involving a host government with high 
values of potential reputation loss. 
The implications of the model are tested using the data gathered on 222 
concluded cases of corporation versus host state arbitration. The results suggest that 
greater amount of previous involvement in ICSID arbitration increases the likelihood of 
settlement significantly. This result holds under different specifications of the model. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
      
       
 
 
2.1. Literature Review 
The literature on WTO dispute settlement has various topics of interest one of 
which is the role and content of developing nations’ involvement. Although some argue 
that it offers an egalitarian platform of dispute resolution, that lets developing nations to 
voice their stance, other argue that these suggestions are hardly correct (Busch, 
Reinhardt 2003). The relative power of developed and developing nations in 
international settings have been of interest to many ( Bown, and Hoekman, 2005, Bütler 
and Hauser, 2000, Bush and Reindhart, 2003), and this study aims to highlight another 
dimension in which developing nations tend to fail to execute their power in the context 
of an international setting.  
The expansion of economic openness across developing countries has been a 
prominent economic movement during the past few decades. However, the political 
economy of disputes between investor corporations and host governments, that arise out 
of such movements, has not been investigated as much because its institutionalization 
evolved greatly only in the recent past. ICSID became the single most important 
institution concerning such dispute; since its first case in 1974, of the total 372 cases 
brought to ICSID, 303 of them were cases filed since 2000. Political economy 
concerning ICSID and the behavior of host countries are areas of research that can offer 
new insights into the power structures of world politics from the perspective of 
developing states. 
One such paper is by Allee and Peinhardt (2010) where they estimate the choice 
of appointing legal delegation to ICSID, by including a clause in BIT, as a dependent 
variable explained by home and host government preferences. They run an ordered 
probit model of ICSID delegation (ICSID may not be included in the BIT, may be 
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included as one of the preferred options for dispute settlement, or may be included as 
the only legal delegation of dispute). The results suggest that when the home country 
has significantly higher bargaining power against the host state, then the host state is 
pressured into ICSID delegation even though it is against its best interest(full delegation 
to ICSID implies domestic courts are not an option for dispute resolution as they were 
before). Another study by the authors, published in 2011, investigates the effect of BITs 
on FDI. Several studies have focused on the effects of BITs on FDI and the results 
suggest that BITs increase both investment protection and the level of investment 
(Neumayer and Spess, 2005, Salacuse and Sullivan, 2005). However, Allee and 
Peinhardt (2011) argue that the increased effect on FDI due to signing of BITs is 
contingent upon full compliance of BIT rules. When the host governments do not 
comply fully with the bilateral agreement and the dispute goes to ICSID, host 
governments incur reputation costs that decrease the flow of FDI. Cross-sectional time-
series analysis reveals that governments whose behavior is challenged by legal disputes 
brought to ICSID experience reduced FDI flows, because of the reputation loss that 
affect current and future investors. 
While Allee and Peinhardt (2011) emphasize the role of ICSID in generating 
reputation, and ultimately, affecting FDI flows, my study focuses on the role of ICSID 
in generating reputation that consequently affect the bargaining power of host 
governments. That is, reputation generated by involvement in ICSID cases not only 
affects host governments with respect to future economic income, but also affects them 
in terms of their political power as international actors when concerned with disputes 
against foreign investors. 
In the next section, I provide a simple formal model that highlights the effect of 
reputation on host government behavior. Game theoretical analysis of reputation costs 
have been mainly studied with respect to audience costs. When leaders make public 
commitments and fail to fulfill them, it affects their reputation, and credibility with 
respect to their future actions when it comes to international conflict (Leventoğlu &  
Tarar 2008, 2009). Audience cost literature has been extensive, the concept applied to 
various circumstances of international conflict such as crisis bargaining (Schultz 2001), 
economic sanctions (Hovi,  Huseby & Sprinz 2005), economic coercion (Krustev, 2010) 
and domestic electoral competition as a commitment device for international crisis 
(Ramsay 2004). These studies offer models of state versus state bargaining where 
potentially both sides can incur additional costs by being involved in a dispute. This 
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study focuses on investor versus state bargaining in which only one side has potential 
losses of reputation. In essence, reputation costs host governments incur during 
international disputes are audience costs with respect to international investment 
community. If the government in a dispute is not cleared of the alleged accusations by 
the end of arbitration, it suffers costs that affect its future stance within the international 
community. Fearon (1994) offers a simple crisis bargaining model with audience costs, 
where incomplete information leads to war, and Rauchhaus (2006) presents a version of 
Fearon's model without audience costs but with third party mediation. To emphasize the 
effect of reputation, the next section introduces a formal model that is an extension of 
Rauchhaus (2006) without third party mediation, but with only one actor vulnerable to 
reputation costs. The goal of this study is to extend the literature on the reputation 
effects generated by ICSID arbitration that are borne by host governments, by first 
offering a formal model of bargaining and second by testing the implications of the 
model using available case load of investor-state dispute settlement. 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Formal Model 
To analyze why reputation costs affect the likelihood of settlement in an 
investor-state dispute, I first present a simple game theoretical model of bargaining in 
which a dis-satisfied party requests a certain amount of compensation. The 
conceptualization emphasizes that when only the satisfied party is faced with additional 
costs of reputation, the equilibrium becomes tilted in favor of the dissatisfied party's 
preferences, which in turn affect the likelihood of outcome such that in order to avoid 
additional costs, settlement becomes a more likely outcome. 
 
 
 
2.2.1. An Investor-State Bargaining Game 
This bargaining game represents investor-state disputes over foreign direct 
investment, when the investor corporation brings its case to ICSID claiming a violation 
of a certain contract that adheres to the progression of the investment, and requesting a 
certain amount of compensation. The relevant notation adhering to the formal model 
can be found in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Formal Model Notation 
Variable Value Description 
x  Player C's negotiated settlement offer 
a  Amount awarded to Player C at court 
r  Player G's reputation cost 
p ϵ(0,1) Player C’s chance of winning at court 
1-p ϵ(0,1) Player G’s chance of winning at court 
c  Player C's costs for legal proceedings 
𝑔𝐻  High resolve Player G's costs for legal proceedings 
𝑔𝐿  Low resolve Player G's costs for legal proceedings 
q ϵ(0,1) Probability that Player G has high resolve 
1-q ϵ(0,1) Probability that Player G has low resolve 
γ ϵ(0,1) Players legal cost coefficient for settlement 
λ ϵ(0,1) Player G's reputation cost coefficient for settlement 
α ϵ(0,1) Player G's reputation cost coefficient for winning at court 
 
I offer a simple bargaining game between two players: Player C (Investor) and 
Player G (State). The strategy sets for each player are 𝑆𝐶 = 𝑥 ∈  0,1 ,   𝑆𝐺 =
{𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡} and the type space for Player G is 𝑇𝐺 = {𝑔𝐻  , 𝑔𝐿  }.  In the face of 
international legal disputes, there exists uncertainty about the state's resolve, that is, its 
willingness to go along with legal action and suffer from legal costs. The outline of the 
model can be seen in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 An investor-state bargaining game without reputation costs
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I assume that The Nature moves first and chooses Player G's type: with 
probability q the type is "high resolve" 𝑔𝐻  and with probability (1-q) the type is low 
resolve𝑔𝐿, where 𝑔𝐻  <  𝑔𝐿. The corporation moves second, at period t=1, and demands 
an amount x in compensation for the damages he claims to have suffered from. This 
demand is an out-of court settlement amount that the corporation makes after legal 
proceedings have been initiated. One can think of it as a take-it-or-leave-it offer that the 
corporation makes before the case goes to court to be fully investigated. If the state 
accepts to pay the demand and settle, the game ends and the legal proceedings are 
terminated, with the amount x exchanged between players, and legal costs incurred thus 
far, paid (𝛾𝑐) for the corporation and (𝛾𝑔𝐻 ) or, (𝛾𝑔 𝐿 ) for the state. I assume that 
because the legal proceedings are discontinued, the legal costs are realized only as a 
fraction 𝛾𝜖(0,1) of the full amount that would have been realized if the case went to 
court.  
If the state refuses to pay the amount demanded, then at period t=2, players go to 
court and the case is investigated. The probability that the corporation wins at court is p 
and the probability that state wins is (1-p). If the corporation wins, the court decides on 
an amount a, that is to be paid by the state for the compensation of damages. If the state 
wins, then it means that the corporation's claims were not accepted and thus, the 
corporation receives nothing. In both cases players pay their respective costs for the 
proceedings that are fully realized, c for the corporation and 𝑔𝐻  , 𝑔𝐿   for the state.  
 
 
 
2.2.1.1. Equilibria Under Complete Information 
The equilibrium is determined by backward induction. The expected utilities 
from going to court, for both players are:  
𝐸𝑈𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝 𝑎 − 𝑐 +  1 − 𝑝  −𝑐 = 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐 
𝐸𝑈𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝 −𝑎 − 𝑔𝐻   +  1 − 𝑝  −𝑔𝐻   = −𝑝𝑎 − 𝑔𝐻  high resolve 
𝐸𝑈𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝 −𝑎 − 𝑔𝐿   +   1 − 𝑝  −𝑔𝐿   = −𝑝𝑎 − 𝑔𝐿  low resolve 
The state accepts to pay the amount demanded x if the utility from settlement 
exceeds its utility from going to court: 
−𝑥 − 𝛾𝑔𝐻 ≥ −𝑝𝑎 − 𝑔𝐻   high resolve 
−𝑥 − 𝛾𝑔𝐿 ≥ −𝑝𝑎 − 𝑔𝐿   low resolve 
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The optimal amount of x that the corporation demands will be the value that 
equates the state's return from settlement and going to court: 
𝑥𝐻
∗ = 𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝛾) 𝑔𝐻  high resolve 
𝑥𝐿
∗ = 𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝛾) 𝑔𝐿 low resolve 
The corporation is strictly better off by demanding 𝑥𝑖
∗ and settling instead of 
demanding a higher amount and going to court as: 
𝑝𝑎 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝑖 − 𝛾𝑐 > 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐  ∀𝑖 
Thus, under complete information equilibrium the corporation demands the 
exact amount that would make the state indifferent between going to court and 
settlement. The unique complete information sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is (𝑥𝑖
∗; 
settle) ∀ i.  
 
 
 
2.2.1.2. Equilibria Under Incomplete Information 
Suppose now that the corporation is uncertain about state's resolve type. The 
corporation's probability of facing a high resolve type is equal to q and a low resolve 
type is equal to (1-q). High resolve type implies 𝑔𝐻 < 𝑔𝐿  and therefore, 𝑥𝐻  < 𝑥𝐿 (states 
that consider the legal costs to be highly burdensome are less resolve as they need to 
pay a higher level of 𝑔). That is, for x ≤ 𝑥𝐻  high resolve will accept the demand and 
settle, and for x ≤ 𝑥𝐿 low resolve will accept the demand and settle. For the interval 𝑥𝐻  
< x< 𝑥𝐿 the low resolve will settle and the high resolve will choose to go to court. Thus, 
the corporation will choose to demand the small amount 𝑥𝐻  as long as its return is 
greater than taking a risk and demand the large amount  𝑥𝐿: 
𝐸𝑈𝐶(𝑥𝐻) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐶(𝑥𝐿) 
𝑥𝐻 ≥ 𝑞 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑥𝐿 
𝑝𝑎 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑔𝐻 ≥ 𝑞 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞)(𝑝𝑎 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿) 
𝑝𝑎 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐻 ≥ 𝑞𝑝𝑎 − 𝑞𝑐 + 𝑝𝑎 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿 − 𝑞𝑝𝑎 − 𝑞 1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿 
 1 − 𝛾 (𝑔𝐻 − 𝑔𝐿) ≥ −𝑞𝑐 − 𝑞 1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿 
− 1 − 𝛾 (𝑔𝐿 − 𝑔𝐻) ≥ 𝑞(−𝑐 −  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿) 
𝑞∗ ≡
− 1 − 𝛾 (𝑔𝐿 − 𝑔𝐻)
(−𝑐 −  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿)
 
The critical value for the probability that the state has high resolve 𝑞∗ 
determines the equilibria. For 𝑞∗ > 𝑞, the corporation takes the risk and demands the 
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high amount 𝑥𝐿. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (𝑥𝐿
∗; court) for 𝑖 = 𝐻 and (𝑥𝐿
∗; 
settle) for 𝑖 = 𝐿. This equilibrium has the same risk-return trade off mechanism offered 
initially in Fearon (1996) where war becomes an optimal outcome under incomplete 
information as the dissatisfied state takes a chance under uncertainty. This is due to the 
fact that the dissatisfied state considers the chance of facing a high resolve type to be 
low. For 𝑞∗ < 𝑞, the corporation avoids the risk and demands the small amount 𝑥𝐻
∗  and 
both players are better off with settlement. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
(𝑥𝐻
∗ ;  settle).  
 
 
 
2.2.2. An Investor-State Bargaining Game with Reputation Costs 
I now assume that in addition to the legal costs, the state incurs reputation costs 
because of its involvement in an international dispute. Reputation costs increase as the 
legal proceedings continue but is realized in the smallest amount when the game ends 
with a court decision that is in favor of the state, such that 𝛼𝑟 < 𝜆𝑟 < 𝑟. It is important 
to note that, even if a state wins the case, the filing of a case against it brought on to 
ICSID itself affects a state's reputation as it still signals an unfavorable environment to 
the foreign investor. The outline of the model can be seen in Figure2.2.     
Figure 2.2 An investor-state bargaining game with reputation costs    
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2.2.2.1. Equilibria Under Complete Information 
The equilibrium is solved through backward induction and the optimal amount 
of 𝑥 that equates the state's return from settlement and going to court becomes: 
𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗ =  𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟 + 𝑎𝑝 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐻  
𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗ =  𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟 + 𝑎𝑝 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿  
The amount  𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟  is the additional reputation factor that is 
increasing in 𝑝 and α and decreasing in λ. If the probability of losing is high (𝑝 ↑), then 
the state is willing to pay a greater amount for settlement. Additionally, if the reputation 
cost incurred after a court win is high (𝛼 ↑) then, for greater values of 𝑥, the state 
becomes more inclined to settle than going to court. However, if the reputation costs 
already incurred is high (𝜆 ↑) then the state prefers to go to court rather than settling for 
higher values of 𝑥.  
If the reputation factor is positive then Nash equilibrium is (𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗, settle) ∀𝑖. The 
corporation demands the exact amount that would make state indifferent between 
settling and going to court, that makes him strictly better off than demanding any other 
value of 𝑥. Compared to the model without reputation costs, the state is willing to settle 
for higher values of compensation. If the reputation factor is negative then 
 𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 ∀𝑖 is still a Nash equilibrium if and only if  1 − 𝛾  𝑔𝑖 + 𝑐 ≥
 𝜆𝑝𝛼 − 𝑝 − 𝛼 𝑟. This condition insures that the corporation is still strictly better off 
with a settlement. If the reputation factor is large enough such that  1 − 𝛾  𝑔𝑖 + 𝑐 <
 𝜆𝑝𝛼 − 𝑝 − 𝛼 𝑟  the corporation is better off by going to court as the equilibrium 
settlement amount it can demand becomes too low. Thus, in this case there is infinitely 
many Nash equilibria where the corporation demands a low enough value that both 
parties choose to go to court (𝑥𝜖 0, 𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗ , 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡). 
 
 
 
2.2.2.2. Equilibria Under Incomplete Information 
Under uncertainty, the corporation will avoid the risk and demand a small 
amount 𝑥𝐻  if: 
𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗ ≥ 𝑞 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗ 
 𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐻 + 𝑎𝑝
≥ 𝑞 𝑎𝑝 − 𝑐 +  1 − 𝑞   𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟 +  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿 + 𝑎𝑝  
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𝑞𝑅∗ ≡
− 1 − 𝛾 (𝑔𝐿 − 𝑔𝐻)
(−𝑐 −  1 − 𝛾 𝑔𝐿 −  𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟)
 
For 𝑞𝑅∗ > 𝑞,, the corporation takes the risk and demands the high amount 𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗. 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗;court) for 𝑖 = 𝐻 and (𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗; settle) for 
𝑖 = 𝐿. For 𝑞𝑅∗ < 𝑞 , the corporation avoids the risk and demands the small amount 
𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗ and both players are better off with settlement. The subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is (𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗; settle). If  𝑝 + 𝛼 − 𝑝𝛼 − 𝜆 𝑟 > 0  then 𝑞𝑅∗ < 𝑞∗  suggesting that 
the corporation is less willing to take a risk and demand a high amount (and face court 
decision if the state is high resolve) as the tendency of the state to settle has increased. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Hypothesis 
The equilibria of the formal model are summarized in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 Equilibria of the Bargaining Game 
 Without Reputation r Condition With Reputation r Condition 
Complete 
Information 
(𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) ∀𝑖  (𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒)  ∀𝑖 𝑟 ≥ r 
(𝑥𝜖 0, 𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗ , 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡) 𝑟 < r 
Incomplete 
Information 
(𝑥𝐻
∗ , 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) ∀𝑖 𝑞∗ < 𝑞 (𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒)  ∀𝑖 𝑞𝑅∗ < 𝑞 
 (𝑥𝐿
∗, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡) 𝑖 = 𝐿  𝑞∗ > 𝑞 (𝑥𝐿
𝑅∗, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡) 𝑖 = 𝐿  𝑞𝑅∗ > 𝑞 
 (𝑥𝐻
∗ , 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) 𝑖 = 𝐻   (𝑥𝐻
𝑅∗, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) 𝑖 = 𝐻   
 
Suppose there is complete information such that the corporation is aware of how 
resolute the host government can be when it comes to legal proceedings. That is, the 
state's willingness to go along with legal actions, and the ability to pay legal fees, is 
known by the corporation. The existence of reputation costs incurred during the 
duration of the dispute adds additional burden to the state and the equilibrium 
settlement amount increases such that  𝑥𝑖
∗ < 𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗. The state becomes more willing to 
settle for higher demands of compensation to avoid prolonging the dispute. For cases 
where too much negative information concerning the host government's behavior has 
already been public, the government may choose to settle or go to court depending on 
the level of exposure to foreign investors. The threshold level for reputation becomes: 
𝑟 =
 1 − 𝛾 (𝑔𝑖 + 𝑐)
(𝜆 + 𝑝𝛼 − 𝑝 − 𝛼)
≥ 𝑟 
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If there is uncertainty over the type of government such that there is incomplete 
information from corporation's point of view, in cases where the probability of facing a 
high resolve government is low, the corporation might take a risk and demand the high 
amount. Otherwise, the corporation asks for the low amount and both types of 
government choose to settle. The critical value for this probability is lower when there 
are reputation costs. The corporations are willing to take less risk by demanding the 
high amount. Thus, the lower limit of 𝑞 for settlement decreases, which should imply an 
increase in the likelihood of observing a settlement. Similar to the outcomes under 
complete information, for cases when the reputation has already been harmed 
extensively, the effect is the opposite. The negative effect of the reputation already lost, 
increases the critical level for 𝑞, making the corporation take more chances as compared 
to the model without reputation costs, the state becomes more willing to go to court 
rather than settlement. 
In short, the existence of potential reputation loss increases threshold demand 
level for settlement as (𝑥𝑖
𝑅∗ > 𝑥𝑖
∗) and furthermore, it positively affects the corporate 
preferences over settlement as (𝑞𝑅∗ < 𝑞∗) . Consequently, in the context of ICSID 
dispute settlement mechanism, for cases concerning governments who face higher 
levels of reputation costs (higher values of 𝑟) the likelihood of reaching a settlement out 
of court increases: 
 
Hypothesis: Governments that pay higher reputation costs will be more likely to 
settle in the context of ICSID international investor-state dispute 
settlement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
3.1. The Data 
My main goal is to underline the effect of reputation on the likelihood of 
settlement, for cases concerning foreign investor-host state dispute. Thus, this research 
can be observed as an extension to Allee and Peinhardt (2011) where the emphasis is on 
the role of international institutions, and specifically ICSID, in generating state 
reputations. The previous involvement in a dispute creates a certain reputation which in 
turn affects the likelihood of settlement in cases brought on in later periods. 
The data is comprised of concluded ICSID cases. The total number of concluded 
cases is 242, however, certain cases are excluded as they are beyond my model's 
application. A summary of cases is presented in Table 3.1. My focus is on cases where a 
foreign corporation files a dispute against a host government that faces potential losses 
of reputation by signaling an inhospitable business environment. Thus, I exclude cases 
of corporation versus corporation, and state versus a corporation. Additionally, I 
exclude conciliatory cases because by nature they are not as binding and formal as 
arbitration cases. The conciliators, as opposed to arbitrators, do not have the power to 
call in witnesses or evidence, and at the final order of the dispute do no issue a legal 
decision or an award. It should be noted that ICSID does not itself conciliate or arbitrate 
disputes but instead offers facilities for conciliation or arbitration. The international 
arbitrators and conciliators that are part of the decision making process, for instance, do 
not work for ICSID but are appointed independently for each case. From the 232 cases 
available I further exclude 7 cases because their host government state is a high income 
country (There are 3 cases against United States, and one against each of the rest: Spain, 
Germany, New Zealand and Iceland.) The reason for my exclusion is that for these 
states, being part of an ICSID dispute should not significantly affect their reputation in 
the eyes of foreign investors. Well established institutions with extensive property rights  
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Table 3.1 Summary of ICSID Concluded Cases 
Type Outcome Rule Frequency 
Corp v. 
Corp 
Arbitration     2 
  Award   2  
  Settlement   0  
  Discontinuance   0  
State v. 
Corp 
Arbitration     2 
  Award   1  
  Settlement   1  
  Discontinuance   0  
Corp v. 
State 
      
 Conciliatory     6 
  Report   3  
  Settlement   3  
  Discontinuance   0  
 Arbitration     232 
  Award   139  
  Settlement   60  
  Discontinuance   33  
   Rule # 44 13   
   Rule # 
43(1) 
11   
   Rule # 
14(3) 
8   
   Rule # 
49(1) 
1   
Total 242 
 
protection are essential features of developed, high income states, and thus, involvement 
in international disputes should not significantly change their attractiveness for foreign 
investment. I do not include two cases against Guinea as in the year during the initiation 
of the cases there was a coup d'etat that brought forth lack of a government for two 
years. The last case I exclude is case no. ARB(AF)/04/2 Cargill, Incorporated v. 
Republic of Poland as the case itself has been moved to United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) for a decision due to jurisdiction, and no legal 
conclusion has been reached under ICSID rules. 
A summary of respondent countries along with the number of cases against them 
can be seen in table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Respondent Countries  
Country Cases Country Cases 
Albania 3 Liberia 2 
Algeria 2 Lithuania 1 
Argentine 25 Macedonia 1 
Armenia 1 Malaysia 3 
Azerbaijan 3 Mali 1 
Bangladesh 3 Mexico 13 
Bolivia 2 Mongolia 1 
Bosnia Herzagovina 1 Morocco 1 
Burkina Faso 1 Nicaragua 1 
Burundi 2 Nigeria 2 
Cameroon 2 Pakistan 5 
Central African 
Republic 
1 Panama 1 
Chile 2 Papua New Guinea 1 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
8 Paraguay 1 
Republic of Congo 4 Peru 4 
Costa Rica 5 Phillipines 2 
Cote d’Ivoire 2 Romania 4 
Czech Republic 1 Rwanda 1 
Ecuador 10 Saudi Arabia 1 
Egypt 10 Senegal 1 
El Salvador 1 Serbia 1 
Estonia 3 Seychelles 1 
Gabon 1 Slovak Republic 2 
Gambia 1 Slovenia 1 
Georgia 5 South Africa 1 
Ghana 2 Sri Lanka 2 
Grenada 3 St.Kitts & Nevis 1 
Guyana 1 Tanzania 1 
Honduras 2 Togo 1 
Hungary 4 Trinidad & Tobago 1 
Indonesia 2 Tunisia 1 
Jamaica 3 Turkey 5 
Jordan 5 Ukraine 8 
Kazakhstan 5 United Arab 
Emirates 
1 
Kenya 1 Uzbekistan 1 
Korea 1 Venezuela 7 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 Yemen 2 
Lebanon 1 Zimbabwe 1 
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3.2. Operationalization of Regression Variables 
The two estimation methods used are conducted using the same set of 
independent variables but defer in the specification of the dependent variable. 
 
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
The main hypothesis emphasizes the potential increases in the likelihood of 
settlement, when the respondent governments are prone to face high reputation costs. In 
order to measure the likelihood of settlement, I have generated two variables. I do so 
because the outcome of an ICSID proceeding can take three forms: settlement, award or 
discontinuance. Table 3.3 gives a summary of the outcomes according to their type. 
 
Table 3.3 Summary of Cases by Outcome 
Outcome Frequency Percentage 
Award   132 59.46 % 
 In favor of State 42   
 In favor of 
Investor 
53   
 Lack of 
Jurisdiction 
28   
 Not Public 9   
Settlement   58 26.13 % 
Discontinuance   32 14.41 % 
 Rule #44 13   
 Rule #43(1) 11   
 Rule #14(3) 8   
Total 222 100 % 
 
 Even though ICSID regulations offer many clauses suggesting possible reasons 
for discontinuance, all cases with the exception of one are discontinued on the grounds 
of three ICSID rules. Rule 44 is titled “Discontinuance at Request of a Party”, and states 
that if a party requests the discontinuance of the proceeding, and the other party given 
notice of this request does not object to it within a fix time limit, then the Tribunal or 
Secretary-General takes an official notice of the discontinuance of the case. A very 
similar regulation is Rule 43 clause (1), “Settlement and Discontinuance”, which state 
that if, before an award has been rendered, the parties agree on a settlement or decide to 
discontinue the proceeding for other reasons, then the Tribunal or the Secretary - 
General issues an official note of discontinuance. Rule 14, clause (3), is part of the 
financial regulations, as opposed to administrative regulations that Rules 44 and 43 are 
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a part of, and states in short that ICSID has the right to discontinue the proceedings if 
payments regarding the case are not paid in due time.  
Although the rules themselves suggest a potential existence of settlement 
reached by the parties, one cannot know for sure the outcome for these cases. Thus, my 
first dependent variable is a binary variable coded 0 if there is an award, and coded 1 if 
there's a settlement, and does not take into account cases that are discontinued. The 
second dependent variable takes into account the cases of discontinuance, and is an 
ordered variable coded 0 if there is a settlement, 1 if there is discontinuance and finally, 
2 if there is an award. Discontinuance is taken as an outcome categorized in between a 
settlement and an award because of two reasons. First, the reasons for discontinuance 
need not imply a settlement. The discontinuance may be due to a change of heart on the 
side of the corporation or it could be that the government has privately defended its case 
against the accusations and the corporation decides that there is not a substantial enough 
case worth its time and expenses. Second, the average duration of cases that result in 
discontinuance is greater than the average duration of cases with settlement, but less 
than that of cases with an award. Thus, the outcome is coded such that the case duration 
is sorted in ascending order, in essence ranking the outcomes in terms of willingness to 
settle. 
 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
My primary variable of interest is the reputation cost, "𝑟"  , and it is 
operationalized as an indicator that measures the number of ICSID cases concluded or 
pending against a country at any given time. During an ICSID dispute, as mentioned 
earlier, the host government incurs a loss of reputation in the eyes of the international 
investment community for three reasons. First, the filing of the case itself signals 
government's allegedly poor behavior and its reluctance in reaching an agreement. 
Second, the greater the duration of the case indicates shows a government being in a 
dispute for a longer period of time. Third, the published procedural orders and the 
award contain information on the specifics of each case, and government's alleged 
wrong doings. Therefore, for host governments who have been previously exposed 
through ICSID cases, potential losses of reputation should be higher as it suggests 
continuation of alleged poor behavior. Therefore, the an increase in the number of cases 
filed against a government before period 𝑡, increases the likelihood of settlement for a 
 18 
case filed at period 𝑡, due to greater levels of potential loss of reputation r. Similar to 
Allee and Peinhardt (2011) three variables considering the varying lengths of time are 
used in estimation: the number of ICSID disputes filed against the government in the 
past 2 years ICSID(2), in the past 5 years ICSID(5), and the number of all cases filed 
since 1966 ICSID(All). settle. 
 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
The likelihood of settlement or the type of outcome whether it be a 
discontinuance or an award, depends additionally on variables that affect the bargaining 
power of the host government. In order to address this issue, I include variables that are 
commonly used in foreign direct investment literature. The intuition is that the more 
vulnerable a host government is in terms of FDI dependence, the less bargaining 
leverage it will have against the investor. The dependence is measured by indicators of 
both economic and political factors. 
The first of the economic indicators is the Market Size thataffects the FDI 
inflows, positively. Campos and Kinoshita (2008),Lis and Resnick (2003) and 
Neumayer and Spess (2005), find market size to be significantly and positively 
correlated with FDI inflows. A larger market indicates ample opportunities for future 
investment, greater FDI inflows, and therefore, greater bargaining power. Greater 
market size is expected to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of settlement as it 
implies greater bargaining power. Corporation's home country GDP is included in the 
model as a measure of its bargaining power. Allee and Peinhardt (2010) use aggregate 
measures of GDP in to capture the relative economic power of the home and host 
countries. Greater home GDP is expected to increase the likelihood of settlement. 
Another important economic indicator of bargaining power is the level of 
Economic Development captured by GDP per capita. Campos and Kinoshita (2008), Li 
and Resnick (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005), again, find economic 
development to be significant factor affecting FDI inflows. Higher levels of economic 
development is expected to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of settlement 
because higher developed countries are able to attract greater FDI compared to less 
developed countries because of differences in essential preconditions for potential 
investments such as infrastructure, human or capital endowment (Li and Resnick, 
2003).  
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A direct measure of FDI Dependence used in the estimation, is the amount of 
inward FDI flows as percentage of gross domestic product. The values of FDI should be 
positively correlated with the likelihood of settlement as economy's greater dependence 
on FDI decreases its bargaining power, as the government has more to lose through 
poor signals of an international dispute. 
Another indicator that measures the international dependence of the host 
economy is Trade Dependence measured as exports of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP. The results of Campos and Kinoshita (2008), and Jensen (2003) 
suggest greater levels of trade to be positively correlated with higher levels of FDI 
inflows. Greater dependence on exports is expected to be positively correlated with the 
likelihood of settlement as an international dispute sends poor signals of business 
dealings with foreign companies. 
One of the important attractions of FDI, is the level of natural resources a host 
country possesses. Campos and Kinoshita (2003), Jensen (2003) and Neumayer and 
Spess (2005) all find this variable to be positively correlated with FDI. The variable 
Natural Resources measured as total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP is 
included in the estimation to isolate this effect. Having abundant natural resources 
increases host government bargaining power as it makes the country attractive to many 
potential investors. Thus, the level of natural resource is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of settlement. 
The last control variable pertaining to economic factors that might affect the 
bargaining power of a host government is the level of net inward FDI in the world, for 
that year. The World FDI variable controls for the available amount of FDI for all the 
host countries. Allee and Peinhardt(2011), and Li and Resnick (2003) find available 
world FDI level to be a significant determinant of FDI inflows. An increase in the 
available FDI should decrease the likelihood of settlement suggesting a negative 
correlation. 
Political factors affect a host governments attractiveness within the international 
investment community. Foreign investors expect host governments to honor their 
agreements and hope to avoid situations of unlawful acts. Thus, the bargaining power a 
host government has against a corporation is related to how much that state is 
considered politically risky. To estimate the effect of political risk on the likelihood of 
settlement, I employ several different indicators from the PRS Group's International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that measure various components of risk perceived by 
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foreign investors. ICRG data has been used in estimations of FDI determination, 
extensively. Alle and Peinhardt (2010, 2011), Campos and Kinoshita (2003, 2008), 
Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), and Neumayer and Spess (2005) use ICRG data 
in order to measure political risk. Rule of Law and Bureaucracy Quality are used in 
every estimation, meanwhile Alle and Peinhardt (2011) aggregate four of the seven 
components below under one variable of  property rights protection (the components 
are corruption, rule of law, bureaucracy quality and investment profile). In every study 
except for Jensen (2003) less political risk is significantly correlated with greater flows 
of FDI. 
For every component, a lower score indicates higher risk therefore I expect 
every component to be negatively associated with the likelihood of settlement. Greater 
political risk, lower the score, a host government should be more likely to settle as it has 
less bargaining power. 
 Internal Conflict ranges from 0 to 12 and is composed of three subcomponents 
each worth 4 points: the existence of civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence 
and civil disorder. The variable is an assessment of political violence and its impact on 
political governance. External Conflict ranges from 0 to 12 with the following 
components: the existence of war, cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures. It 
measures the the risk to the incumbent government from violent and non-violent 
external pressures. Government Stability ranges from 0 to 12 including subcomponents 
of government unity, legislative strength, and popular support that measure the 
government ability to stay in power and carry out its programs. Investment Profile 
ranges from 0 to 12 and includes contract viability/expropritation, profits repatriation 
and payment delays as a measure of risk to investment not covered by economic or 
political factors.  Bureaucracy Quality ranges from 0 to 4 and is indicator that measures 
the extent to which the administrative functions and policy formulations are affected by 
changes in government. Rule of Law ranges from 0 to 6 with two subcomponents of law 
and order, where law measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
order measures the recognition of law. Corruption ranges from 0 to 6 and takes into 
account actual or potential corruption that includes instances such as patronage, 
nepotism and close ties between politics and business world. 
In addition to economic and political factors that affect the bargaining process, 
the model includes economic sector variables. The categories are oil, gas and mining, 
electricity or other energy sources, services and trade, construction, water sanitation 
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systems or other, which includes sectors such as agriculture and tourism. These 
economic sectors are determined by how ICSID codes them in their analysis with 
respect to subject matter for each case. For cases in relation to oil, gas and mining and 
electricity and other power, the expected relation is positive as these investments 
require longer duration and higher amounts of capital, decreasing host governments 
bargaining power, making them more likely to settle. If there is a greater income at 
stake, the governments should be less willing to be observed as contentious. 
In order to deal with skewed distributions, in the estimation logged values of 
GDP, GDP per capita and World FDI measures are used. Data on all economic 
variables expect FDI dependence is from World Development Indicators. Data on FDI 
dependence is from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). All values are for the year the case has been registered. Summary statistics 
of all variables is presented in Table 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std Min Max 
GDP, host 222 1.09e+11 1.70e+11 2.31e+08 8.49e+11 
GDP, home 222 4.30e+12 4.80e+12 1.33e+10 1.46e+13 
GDP per capita, 
host 
222 3824.217 4297.171 86.7646 33740.84 
FDI/GDP, host 222 3.81894 4.862215 -14.36902 45.50694 
Exports/GDP, host 222 35.97748 19.22556 6.855818 121.3114 
Natural 
Resources, host 
222 12.00126 15.22485 0 92.63554 
World FDI net 222 1.07e+12 6.46e+11 1.26e+10 2.35e+12 
ICSID (2) 222 2.445946 5.735044 0 35 
ICSID (5) 222 3.198198 6.40393 0 34 
ICSID (All) 222 4.18018 7.74503 0 47 
Internal Conflict 189 8.833774 1.902556 .4166667 12 
External Conflict 189 9.863095 1.440207 4 12 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
189 1.999118 .8943214 0 4 
Rule of Law 189 3.189594 1.107739 .75 6 
Government 
Stability 
189 8.252706 1.717458 2.083333 11 
Investment Profile 189 7.248457 2.368741 1 12 
Corruption 189 2.228836 .7645918 0 5 
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Table 3.5 Summary Statistics, Economic Sector 
Variable Observation Percentage 
Oil, Gas &Mining 51 22.97 % 
Electric Power &  
Other Energy 
26 11.71 % 
Services & Trade 31 13.96 % 
Construction 42 18.91 % 
Water, Sanitation 
&  
Flood Protection 
15 6.75 % 
Other 57 25.67 % 
Total 222 100 % 
 
 
 
 
3.3.Methodology 
The data for each case is gather based on the date of registration. The reputation 
effect, economic, and political factors of period t are the independent variables that 
affect the likelihood of investment at period t+1 such that: 
 \Outcome_{i,t+1}=  𝛼𝑖+ β*𝐼𝐶𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡  + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 ,𝑡+ 𝛿 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡   
+ 𝜃 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
where ECON is a vector of 8 variables of economic factors, POL is a vector of 7 
variables of political factors and SECTOR includes dichotomous variables of economic 
sector that case i belongs to. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
The empirical model is estimated using two estimation methods, logit and 
ordered logit regressions were conducted, respectively. 
 
 
 
4.1. Logit Estimation Results 
The results for the logit estimation are presented at Table 4.1. The binary 
dependent variable is coded 0 if there is an award and 1 if there is a settlement. The first 
column gives the results for the model without reputation costs. World FDI available is 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of settlement which was expected. The level of 
available investment in international economy decreases the bargaining power of 
recipient countries which in turn make them more likely to settle. Internal Conflict is 
significant, but interestingly, the coefficient sign is positive indicating that having less 
risky domestic environment increases the likelihood of settlement. The initial 
expectation was host countries with greater risk and turmoil, should have less 
bargaining leverage, as they are risky investment environments to begin with, and 
therefore be more likely to settle. This result suggests that perhaps government who are 
in turmoil due to domestic violence, have more important issues to deal with and that 
they are less willing to work on a settlement over an international dispute with a 
corporation. 
External Conflict is significant and has the expected sign, countries with greater 
international, cross-border turmoil are more likely to settle, as having already a poor 
reputation decreases their bargaining power, and may initiate host governments to end 
the dispute as soon as possible. Electric Power and Energy is significant as well, 
suggesting that if the dispute is over a case concerning an investment that has to do with 
power generation in the host country, then the likelihood of settlement increases. 
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Table 4.1 The effects of reputation on the likelihood of settlement 
 4.1     4.2 4.3 4.4 
ICSID (past 2 years)  .088 **(.045)   
ICSID (past 5 years)   .069 *(.037)  
ICSID (all)    .055 * (.032) 
GDP host, log -.293 
(.195) 
-.371 *  
(.199) 
-.385 
*(.202) 
-.384 *    
(.203) 
GDP home, log .057 
(.126) 
.065 
 (.125) 
.063  
(.124) 
.065   
(.124 ) 
GDP capita host, log -.037 
(.395) 
-.043 
 (.373) 
-.023  
(.396) 
-.022    
(.389) 
FDI Dependence .027 
(.057) 
.022   
(.054) 
.018 
 (.053) 
.018    
(.055) 
Trade Dependence -.002 
(.011) 
.004  
(.011) 
.004  
(.012) 
.003    
(.012) 
Natural Resources .017 
(.016) 
.012  
(.016) 
.012  
(.016) 
.012   
 (.016) 
World FDI Net, log -.595 * 
(.335) 
-.725 ** 
(.351) 
-.737 ** 
(.354) 
-.734 **    
(.357) 
Internal Conflict .332 ** 
(.159) 
.221 
(.154) 
.228   
(.157) 
.240   
 (.157) 
External Conflict -.329 * 
(.188) 
-.287 * 
(.184) 
-.292 * 
(.185) 
-.295 *  
 (.186) 
Government Stability .213 
 (.161) 
.200  
(.169) 
.195  
 (.155) 
.209    
(.168) 
Investment Profile -.090 
(.104) 
-.015 
 (.121) 
-.011  
(.122) 
-.027    
(.116) 
Bureaucracy Quality .433 
(.322) 
.176  
(.338) 
.187   
(.340)   
.216    
(.341) 
Rule of Law -.298 
(.236) 
-.139  
(.246) 
-.153  
(.245) 
-.170   
(.244) 
Corruption .207 
(.309) 
.120  
(.297) 
.117  
(.299) 
.138    
(.302)   
Oil, Gas & Mining .851 
(.671) 
.907 
 (.716) 
.905  
(.711) 
.899    
(.701) 
Electric Power & 
Energy 
1.119* 
(.631) 
1.164* 
 (.676) 
1.190 * 
(.669) 
1.197 *  
(.662) 
Services & Trade .746 
 (.685) 
1.016  
(.695) 
1.010 (.698) .965  
 (.695) 
Construction .625 
(.683) 
.805  
(.683) 
.837  
(.691) 
.801   
(.688) 
Water, Sanitation &  
Flood Protection 
.336 
(.849) 
.486 
 (.829) 
.527  
(.838) 
.514    
(.838 ) 
Constant 19.73** 
(8.94) 
24.47*** 
 (9.42) 
25.12***  
(9.58)     
24.92***  
(9.72) 
N 163 163 163 163 
Pseudo R squared 0.1331 0.1544 0.1517 0.1478 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<.01; **p<.05;*p<.10.  
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Column 4.2 reports the results for the model with reputation costs 
operationalized as the number of ICSID cases filed against the host country, in the last 
two years. Compared to the other specifications of the reputation cost ICSID(2) is 
observed to be the most significant suggesting the negative impact of reputation loss is 
more immediate and loses its effect over the years. Even though the reputation effect is 
lessened over the years, it is still significant as ICSID(5) and ICSID(All) are both 
significant. Additionally, World FDI is significant at 5% level throughout different 
model specifications. 
Host country GDP is significant and the coefficient has the expected negative 
sign. Greater market size leads to greater bargaining power and less likelihood of 
settlement. Another interpretation would be that GDP itself is picking up the effect of 
resolve type of the host government in that, greater GDP may imply greater government 
budget and consequently greater ability to go along with legal actions as legal costs as 
perceived less burdensome compared to poorer governments which may find the 
continuous legal spending unsustainable. 
 
 
 
4.2. Ordered Logit Estimation Results 
The ordered logit estimation results are presented at Table 4.2. The dependent 
variable is coded 0 if there is settlement, coded 1 if there is discontinuance and 2 if there 
is an award. Thus, the sign of the coefficients are expected to be the reverse of the 
previous model as governments with greater risk and less bargaining power are more 
likely to prefer outcomes that end the dispute as soon as possible. 
All reputation cost variables are again significant indicating that greater loss of 
reputation, greater values of r increase the likelihood of settlement. World FDI and host 
government GDP are again significant throughout different specifications of the model 
with a positive coefficient as expected. Governments with greater market size and 
greater resources are more willing battle for longer international dispute. The results are 
similar to that of the previous section as other economic factors remains insignificant 
such as FDI and Trade Dependence or the level of Natural Resource.  
However, political risk variables turn out not to be significant in this 
specification of the model. Instead the economic sector that a case belongs to gains 
importance and as expected, for investments that are relatively more long-term that need 
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Table 4.2 The effects of reputation on outcome 
 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
ICSID (past 2 years)  -.064 ** 
(.029) 
  
ICSID(past 5 years)   -.056 *   
(.030) 
 
ICSID(all)    -.039 *  
(.022) 
GDP host, log .303 * 
(.170)  
.373 **  
(.175) 
.375 ** 
(.176) 
.380 ** 
(.179) 
GDP home, log -.024   
(.107)  
-.012   
(.105) 
-.010    
(.105) 
-.016   
(.106) 
GDP capita host, 
log 
-.172   
(.265)  
-.251   
(.280) 
-.239    
(.278) 
-.257   
(.285) 
FDI Dependence -.019   
(.027)  
-.016   
(.027) 
-.018    
(.027) 
-.014   
(.027) 
Trade Dependence .002    
(.010)  
-.002   
(.010) 
-.002   
 (.010) 
-.002  
 (.010) 
Natural Resources -.015  
 (.014)   
-.011  
 (.014) 
-.011    
(.014) 
-.010   
(.014) 
World FDI Net, 
log 
.383   
(.265) 
.510 *  
(.288) 
.475 *  
(.283) 
.511 *  
(.294) 
Internal Conflict -.265** 
(.135)  
-.162  
 (.138) 
-.180 
 (.138) 
-.178   
(.141) 
External Conflict .288 *   
(.162)  
.235   
 (.163) 
.253   
(.162) 
.243    
(.164) 
Government 
Stability 
-.113   
(.120) 
-.124   
(.124) 
-.107  
(.122) 
-.126   
(.124) 
Investment Profile .148 *  
(.082)  
.103   
 (.087) 
.105   
(.087) 
.114   
 (.086) 
Bureacracy Quality -.321 
 (.261) 
-.080   
(.293) 
-.121  
(.286) 
-.132   
(.292) 
Rule of Law .175   
(.201) 
.036    
(.209) 
.048  
 (.209) 
.055   
 (.210) 
Corruption -.134 
 (.257) 
-.045   
(.248) 
-.047  
(.252) 
 -.054  
(.252) 
Oil, Gas & Mining -1.015** 
(.506) 
-1.111** 
(.522) 
-1.110 ** 
(.525) 
-1.091 
**(.521) 
Electric Power &  
Other Energy 
-0.996 *  
(.583) 
-1.041* 
(.603) 
-1.057 *   
(.602) 
-1.061 *   
(.596) 
Services & Trade -.723  
 (.602) 
-.909   
(.605) 
-.911   
 (.608) 
-.870   
(.606) 
Construction -.766   
 (.491)  
-.805* 
(.486) 
-.953 *  
(.501) 
-.807 *  
(.483) 
Water, Sanitation 
& Flood Protection 
 -.485   
(.674) 
-.528  
 (.671) 
-.569    
(.670) 
-.566    
(.666) 
N  191 191 191 191 
Pseudo R squared 0.0790 0.0907 0.0885 0.0863 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 
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greater capital, the likelihood of settlement increases. For such investments, host 
governments can be more willing to settle as the potential loss of investment in those 
areas in the future, let alone for that period are higher than other types of foreign direct 
investment. 
 
 
 
4.3. Analysis 
The logit model results indicate that for each increase in ICSID disputes filed in 
the past two years, the likelihood of settlement is expected to increase on average by 
9.09%, (exp(0.087) - 1= 1.0909 - 1 = 0.0909), for disputes filed in the past five years, 
the likelihood of settlement is expected to increase on average by 7.03%, (exp(0.068) - 
1 = 1.0703 - 1 = 0.0703) and for disputes filed since 1974, the likelihood of settlement 
is expected to increase on average by 5.65% (exp(0.055) - 1 = 1.0565 - 1 = 0.0565), 
while all other variables in the respective models are held constant. 
Additionally, with respect to GDP host, log, for each unit increase in log(GDP) 
of the host country, the likelihood of settlement is expected to decrease on average by 
30.65% while the other variables in Model 2 are held constant. This value is 31.61% in 
Model 3, and 31.55% in Model 4. (Model 2: 1 – exp (-0.366) = 1 - 0.6935 = 0.3065, 
Model 3: 1 - exp(-0.380) = 1 - 0.6839 = 0.3161, Model 4: 1 - exp(-0.379) = 1 - 0.6845 = 
0.3155). 
Another significant factor affecting the likelihood of settlement is World FDI 
Net Inflows such that for each unit increase in log (World FDI Net Inflows), the 
likelihood of settlement is expected to decrease on average by 43.17%, while the other 
variables in Model 1 are held constant. This value is 50.24% in Model 2, 50.79% in 
Model 3, and 50.64% in Model 4. (Model 1: 1 - exp(-0.565) = 1 - 0.5683 = 0.4317, 
Model 2: 1 - exp(-0.698) = 1 - 0.4976 = 0.5024, Model 3: 1 - exp(-0.709) = 1 - 0.4921 = 
0.5079, Model 4: 1 - exp(-0.706) = 1 - 0.4936 = 0.5064.) 
Among political factors, for each unit increase in external conflict (an increase 
in the riskiness with respect to external politics), the likelihood of settlement is expected 
to increase on average by 28.68%, while the other variables in Model 1 are held 
constant. This value is 25.62% in Model 2, 26.07% in Model 3, and 26.29% in Model 4. 
(Model 1: 1 - exp(-0.338) = 1 - 0.7132 = 0.2868, Model 2: 1 - exp(-0.296) = 1 - 0.7438 
= 0.2562, Model 3: 1 - exp(-0.302) = 1 - 0.7393 = 0.2607, Model 4: 1 - exp(-0.305) = 1 
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- 0.7371 = 0.2629.) With respect to economic sector, cases concerned investments in 
electric power & energy are 210% more likely to have settlements than countries 
without electric power & energy, while the other variables in Model 1 are held constant. 
This value is 228% in Model 2, 238% in Model 3, and 241% in Model 4. (Model 1: 
exp(1.133) - 1 = 3.10 - 1 = 2.10, Model 2: exp(1.188) - 1 = 3.28 - 1 = 2.28, Model 3: 
exp(1.218) - 1 = 3.38 - 1 = 2.38, Model 4: exp(1.226) - 1 = 3.41 - 1 = 2.41.) 
Ordered logit estimation results suggest the following predictions. For each 
increase in ICSID disputes filed in the past two years, the ordered log-odds of being in a 
higher settlement category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) 
is expected to decrease on average by 0.0629, while the other variables in the model are 
held constant. This value is 0.055 for ICSID(5) and 0.038 for ICSID(all). 
For each unit increase in log(GDP) of the host country, the ordered log-odds of 
being in a higher settlement category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. 
discontinuance) is expected to increase on average by 0.301 while the other variables in 
Model 1 are held constant. In Model 2, this value is 0.368, in Model 3 0.370, and in 
Model 4 0.374. With respect to World FDI Net Inflows, for each unit increase in 
log(World FDI Net Inflows), the ordered log-odds of being in a higher settlement 
category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) is expected to 
increase on average by 0.485 while the other variables in Model 2 are held constant. In 
Model 3, this value is 0.450, and in Model 4 0.485.  
The political factor External Conflict results in greater odds of settlement as for 
each unit increase in external conflict, the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
settlement category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) is 
expected to increase on average by 0.298 while the other variables in Model 1 are held 
constant. In Model 2, this value is 0.245, in Model 3 0.264, and in Model 4 0.254. 
In terms of economic sector to which the investment belongs to if the case is 
under Oil, Gas and Mining category the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
settlement category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) for 
countries with oil, gas and mining is expected to be 0.994 lower than for countries 
without oil, gas and mining, when all variables in Model 1 are held constant. This value 
is 1.093 in Model 2, 1.094 in Model 3, and 1.075 in Model 4. If the case is under the 
category Electric Power & Energy, the ordered log-odds of being in a higher settlement 
category (discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) for countries with 
electric power and energy is expected to be 1.038 lower than for countries without 
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electric power and energy, when all variables in Model 1 are held constant. This value 
is 1.085 in Model 2, 1.107 in Model 3, and 1.108 in Model 4. Finally, if the case is 
under Construction, the ordered log-odds of being in a higher settlement category 
(discontinuance vs. settlement or award vs. discontinuance) for countries with 
construction is expected to be 0.939 lower than for countries without construction, when 
all variables in Model 3 are held constant. This value is 0.795 in Model 4. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing nations have become important economic and political actors in 
world politics as economic integration redefined bilateral and multilateral relations 
across the world. This thesis emphasizes, similar to several works on WTO dispute 
settlement, that international organizations under certain circumstances fail to 
acknowledge the relative stance developing nations hold with respect to the developed 
world. It adds to the literature on the politics of dispute settlement by highlighting the 
effect of economic interdependence on the outcome of ICSID arbitration.  
This research pinpoints an important new way the common application of ICSID 
arbitration affects host government behavior. Inclusion of a clause that designates 
ICSID as the primary platform of dispute settlement in BITs, were not initially preferred 
by host governments as it negatively affects their sovereignty over investment made 
within the country. The fact that ICSID is able to generate negative reputation for host 
government, adds another dimension to the loss of power by these states. Previous 
involvement in international disputes affects host government behavior such that in 
order to avoid sending further signals of poor behavior, the governments become 
willing to settle the dispute as soon as possible. Thus, for ICSID cases involving states 
that have a potential to pay high levels of reputation costs, the likelihood of settlement 
increases.  
The estimation results suggest a positive correlation between the number of 
cases filed against the host government previously, and the likelihood of settlement for 
the current case. Three different measure are used to operationalize potential levels of 
reputation loss: the number of ICSID cases filed against within the past two years, the 
number of ICSID cases filed against within the past five years and the number of ICSID 
cases filed against since 1974. Although every specification of reputation is significant, 
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the results suggest that more recent filing have a greater impact. Specifically, an one 
unit increase in the number of disputes filed against a country within the past two years, 
increases the likelihood of settlement by 9%., and decreases the likelihood of an award 
by 6%. 
In addition to reputation costs, the estimation results indicate that the GDP of the 
host country, the total level of available net FDI in the world and the economic sector 
that the case belongs to are significant factors that affect the likelihood of settlement for 
an ICSID case.  
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